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 Deviations from the standard expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) 
model to include concern for equity, reference points, reciprocity, envy, malice and the like have 
become commonplace. Other regarding preferences are used to explain why individuals will take 
action that appears to, at least in the short run, be costly to one’s self in order to treat others in a 
particular manner. Research in the area of inequality has benefited greatly from the attention that 
others regarding preferences has garnered. Of late, such interest has spread beyond humans in to 
other species, notably primates and dogs (for a review, see Social Justice Research, volume 25, 
issues 2 and 3, edited by S.F. Brosnan).  Recent empirical research has found interesting 
analogies between humans and these populations, leading to speculation about how these 
behaviors may have evolved (Brosnan and De Waal 2012). However, some noteworthy 
differences in human versus nonhuman behavior pertaining to inequality have also been seen 
(Christen and Glock 2012; Skitka 2012), some of which are difficult to explore due to dissimilar 
methodologies between the taxa.  Although to some degree these are unavoidable due to 
practical constraints (e.g., Brosnan, Newton-Fisher et al. 2009), we propose that one specific area 
of research that would provide insight into commonalities, or lack thereof, is a comparison of 
attitudes toward inequality and risk.  This combination stands to broaden our understanding of 
the conditions and environment that encourage, or discourage, pro-social decision-making and 
elicit negative reactions to inequity. 
The last decade of empirical human research pertaining to pro-social behavior has displayed 
violations of the canonical model with self-interested, material payoff maximizing actors (see 
Ledyard, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2001). The justifications for behavior that violates 
standard assumptions about material maximizing include warm-glow (Andreoni, 1990; Bierhoff, 
2002), reciprocity (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999), reputation (Frank, 2001), envy (Beckman et al., 2002) and aversion to inequality 
(Beckman et al., 2012; Beckman et al., 2004a, 2004b; Pirttila and Uusitalo, 2008; Kroll and 
Davidowitz, 2003; and Amiel and Cowell, 2000). 
While researchers have actively been seeking explanations for behavior that is inconsistent 
with the canonical model, nonhuman research has begun to explore some of these topics as well.  
In particular, the last five years have seen an explosion in work on prosocial behavior in 
nonhuman primates (Silk 2007).  Initial studies indicated that chimpanzees were much less 
prosocial than are humans, with the apes not appearing to notice or care (these are difficult to 
distinguish experimentally) about opportunities to bring rewards to the partner at very little, or 
no, cost to themselves and despite the fact that their partner received no more than they did (Silk, 
Brosnan et al. 2005; Jensen, Hare et al. 2006; Vonk, Brosnan et al. 2008).  This was even true 
when there was the opportunity to increase one’s overall outcomes through reciprocity (Brosnan, 
Henrich et al. 2009).  However, it soon became clear that there was more to the story. Capuchin 
monkeys, for instance, routinely provide benefits to partners (de Waal, Leimgruber et al. 2008), 
even when their partner stands to gain more than they do (Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; 
Brosnan, Houser et al. 2010).  Moreover, cooperatively breeding callithrichids, who share 
parental duties among the mated pair as well as unweaned offspring, typically behave prosocially 
(Burkart, Fehr et al. 2007; Cronin, Schroeder et al. 2010) (although this is not always the case – 
see Cronin, Schroeder et al. 2009; Stevens 2010).  Finally, despite the fact that chimpanzees do 
poorly in the barpull-based prosocial tasks at which capuchins and callithrichids excel, they are 
prosocial in exchange-based tasks (Horner, Carter et al. 2011) and routinely provide assistance, 
including targeted helping, to one another in experimental contexts (Warneken and Tomasello 
2006; Warneken, Hare et al. 2007; Melis, Warneken et al. 2010; Yamamoto, Humle et al. 2012).  
Thus what appears to be the case is that non-human primates do behave in prosocial ways, 
however this behavior is sensitive to both the species in question (e.g., the evolution of this 
behavior was undoubtedly influenced by the species’ ecologies, see, for example, Van Schaik 
and Burkart 2010) as well as the context of the interaction. 
Not only do prosocial behaviors emerge in other primates, but there is also evidence for some 
of the same underlying mechanisms for prosocial behavior that have been discussed for humans, 
although these have often not been considered in the context of prosocial behavior.  For instance, 
authors have argued for evidence, in non-human primates, of the warm-glow (de Waal, 
Leimgruber et al. 2008), reciprocity (de Waal 2000; Gomes, Mundry et al. 2008; Schino and 
Aureli 2008; Gomes and Boesch 2009), reputation (Russell, Call et al. 2008; Subiaul, Vonk et al. 
2008), and aversion towards inequity (for a review, see Brosnan in revision).  Primates are also 
sensitive to risk (McCoy and Platt 2005; Heilbronner, Rosati et al. 2008; Rosati and Hare 2010; 
Proctor, de Waal et al. in prep).  In fact, primates differ in their risk tolerance, presumably due to 
the evolutionary pressures each species has faced (Mulcahy and Call 2007; Penn and Povinelli 
2007). Thus it seems possible that these behaviors share continuity between humans and other 
species, either due to homology of similar cognitive mechanisms, or convergence of similar 
behaviors, albeit with potentially differing cognitive mechanisms.  A better understanding of this 
would help to understand the conditions under which these behaviors evolved in humans.  
Although the literature on this taxon is vast, particularly in the case of humans, we here 
summarize work relevant to laboratory experiments on inequity to provide a framework for 
comparison. 
 
Inequity in human experiments 
Inequality aversion in human research typically refers to differences in acquired 
compensation for similar activities or varying abilities to alter an outcome, which is largely 
connected to financial capabilities. However, inequality can also result from chance that results 
in differences in payouts that are out of the control of subjects. The experimental research in this 
area generally falls into two procedural categories – the use of dictator/ultimatum games and 
some other type of redistribution game. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), 
and Goeree and Holt (2000) have all used the dictator/ultimatum games (or a similar game) and 
found that individuals who were motivated by their own monetary payoffs tend to perform 
poorly in these games. Schildberg-Horisch (2010) adapted the dictator game to allow a veil of 
ignorance and behavior toward risk. The original dictator game was modified with a 50% 
efficiency loss for any funds the dictator transfers to the receiver.  If the assignment of dictator 
and receiver was made before the dictator chose to transfer the funds, then the treatment was 
with positions/states of the world known. If the assignment of role was made after the transfer 
decision, then a veil of ignorance had been imposed.  Behavior toward risk was modeled by 
removing the second player.  Each subject then decided how much to transfer and was 
subsequently randomly assigned to be dictator or receiver given their own choice. No other 
subject is involved.   This research finds a small but statistically significant increase in the 
amount transferred behind a veil of ignorance than in the risk treatment indicating inequality 
aversion. The effect is strongly moderated by a gender effect with women being both more risk 
averse and more inequality averse.  
Other research has focused on the ability to create equality by allowing participants to pay 
for equality. Carlsson et al. (2001) found that left-wing voters and women were both more risk- 
and inequality averse in their choice of paying for more equal societies. Dana et al. (2006) 
designed a clever experiment whereby individuals could incur a $1 loss (payment of $9 instead 
of $10) to avoid playing a dictator game and consequently prevented the would-be receiver from 
finding out that they were playing a dictator game. The majority of participants opted out of the 
game with a payout of $9 and no money being allocated to the would-be receiver, despite the fact 
that a payout of $9 to the dictator and $1 to the receiver was possible if the dictator game was 
carried out. Alternatively, in a “private” dictator game where the receivers were aware that they 
were playing the dictator game, the dictator rarely exits the game and, as seen in past research, 
tends to allocate some money to the receiver. Thus, the popularity of entertaining the option to 
opt out of playing the dictator game with a $1 penalty shows evidence that subjects are averse to 
inequality, or at least are averse to being the cause of inequality, but are more inclined to 
entertain inequality if they can reduce their interaction with the less fortunate.  
Use of a veil of ignorance (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1992; Rawls, 1971; Harsanyi, 1953) 
in understanding individual attitudes toward inequality has become a generally accepted 
baseline. Kroll and Davidowitz (2003) made use of a ‘common game’ and ‘individual game’ in 
order to induce a veil. In the common game, the individuals received the same payout from a 
single, mutual gamble whereas the payouts differed for each participant in the individual game. 
The experiment was carried out with children living in a communal environment and also with 
children living in a city. In short, they found that for small payouts, half of the children preferred 
the common game, but as the payout increased, the desired game changed in the direction of the 
individual game. The finding that individual behavior changed with increases in payoffs is 
supported in Holt and Laury (2002). Additionally, children who were raised in a communal 
environment tend to make more prosocial choices (favoring the common game).  
Beckman et al. (2012) proposed an experiment whereby individuals made choices over 5 
potential states of the world (payoffs). Three treatments were carried out – behind the veil of 
ignorance, risk and positions known –in the experiment. Beckman et al. (2012) allowed the 
subjects to make pairwise redistributions of funds across five states of the world in order to 
invoke the subject’s desired distribution of income. In the risky environment, the subjects were 
ex ante informed that each of the five payoffs was equally likely to be realized and the 
individual’s redistribution governed their actual payoff.1 In the behind the veil treatment, 
subjects again redistributed the funds to their liking, but the median transfer between states of the 
world for all subjects governed the actual payoffs that the individual received. Additionally, each 
state of the world was not equally likely.2 In the positions known treatment, subjects again 
redistributed funds but their state of the world was known ex ante, and the median transfer from 
the group governed the individual payoffs. Examining the differences in redistribution between 
the behind the veil and risk treatments allowed the teasing out of inequality aversion by 
examining an environment with both risk and inequality (behind the veil treatment) and a simply 
risky environment. The impact of pure risk on redistributions is also directly examined by 
comparing redistributions in the risk and positions known treatments.  Thus, the experimental 
design allowed the researchers to disentangle the impacts of risk aversion and inequality aversion 
separately (see also Kroll and Davidowitz (2003) and Carlsson (2001)). Moreover, when 
individuals were asked to reallocate funds across the five potential payoffs in the positions 
known treatment where there were three subjects who would not be impacted by the 
redistribution, they found that individuals who were not impacted by the outcome of the 
reallocation voted in favor of a more equitable redistribution. 
While Beckman et al. (2012) found that individuals favored a more equitable world when 
placed behind a veil of ignorance, the composition of redistribution displayed two interesting 
trends. First, and consistent with the findings in Kuziemko et al. (2010), individuals were averse 
to “last place” such that they did not want to end up with the smallest payoff. In fact, those 
                                                          
1 Five cards were utilized to depict the state of the world and each subject drew a card, with replacement. 
2 In the behind the veil treatments, the subjects drew from the five cards, but without replacement. 
individuals who were receiving the second smallest payoff desired reallocations that ensured that 
the individual receiving the smallest payoff did not end up with a payoff larger than their own. 
Second, in both the behind the veil and risk treatments, females tended to desire more equitable 
redistributions of payouts than did males. Only when positions were known did males begin 
desiring a redistribution that favored a higher degree of equity, which might be an aversion to 
showering the rich with greater payoffs. However, this research did not directly examine the role 
that group dynamics played in the redistribution of payoffs.  
There has also been work that examines the effect of inequality on cooperation in groups. 
Anderson et al. (2008) examined the impact of inequality on cooperation in contributing to a 
public good. Inequality, in this context, came in the form of manipulating the levels and 
distributions of fixed payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. In 
comparison to public goods contributions, when all individual’s contributions were equal, when 
individual’s rank within the experiment is made salient, the contributions decreased significantly 
as a result of the known ranks.  
 
The absence of contributions to the public good often generates conflict within groups, 
especially if the lack of contributions is due to inequality. Abbink et al. (2012) examined this 
issue directly by determining how much conflict arose in a rent (profit) seeking experiment 
where groups could prevent profit generation when unequal shares of the profits existed. In short, 
if a group was set to obtain a smaller share of the profits generated from a profit raising activity, 
they might take actions to prevent the “advantaged” group from obtaining greater profits. 
Surprisingly, though, the authors find little support for the hypothesis that greater inequality – 
due to a larger disparity in the distribution of profits – generates greater conflict amongst groups. 
 
Inequity in non-human primates (and other species) 
Inequity has also been explored in other species, primarily non-human primates.  However, 
the paradigms used to investigate it have differed rather substantially, in large part due to the 
difficulties of giving complex scenario or decision-making tasks to non-verbal species for whom 
instruction cannot be given (thus making it difficult to determine if they understand experimental 
contingencies).  Because of this, there has been far less focus on the Dictator or Ultimatum 
games in non-human primates.  In fact, to date only two studies have explored this game, and 
only in chimpanzees.  The first found that chimpanzees were rational maximizers in an 
ultimatum game, with respondents accepting any offer made by the proposer (Jensen, Call et al. 
2007).  However, additional work showed that the paradigm used with the chimpanzees resulted 
in the same outcome in humans, indicating that the procedure was too dissimilar from the typical 
human procedure to be compared to the existing human literature (Smith and Silberberg 2010).  
A more recent study, comparing “dictator-like” responses to ultimatum game responses found 
that chimpanzees and children both responded by offering a more equal split when the partner 
had the option to refuse, despite the fact that neither children nor chimpanzees ever refused in the 
game (Proctor, Williamson et al. in review).  This may indicate that only the threat of a refusal is 
needed in order to promote more equitable behavior, both in children and chimpanzees.  This 
work also highlights the need for careful consideration of “equivalent” procedures to make sure 
that they really are so (see below and Brosnan, Beran et al. in review for a more detailed 
discussion of this problem). 
Rather than the ultimatum game procedure, work in non-humans has relied more on a paired 
task reminiscent of an Impunity Game (Bolton, Katok et al. 1998; Yamagishi, Horita et al. 2009).  
In the commonly used non-human primate version of this game, pairs of individuals alternately 
interact with a human experimenter, who sometimes pays them the same (e.g., a baseline 
control), sometimes pays one individual more (e.g., an inequity condition) and sometimes offers 
higher amounts, but then returns a lower payoff (e.g., an individual contrast condition).  Subject 
responses in the inequity and individual contrast conditions are compared to their response to the 
same lower-value reward in the baseline control, in which both individuals were given the less 
preferred payoff (for reviews of this procedure, see Brosnan 2006; Price and Brosnan 2012).  
Thus, individuals cannot change either their own or their partners’ outcomes by any action of 
theirs, but they can refuse to participate.  Unlike in a human impunity game, however, the 
experimenter sets the payoffs, rather than the partner, a procedure necessitated largely by the 
problems associated with showing that the primates understand that their payoffs are contingent 
upon their partner’s earlier actions (although see Proctor, Williamson et al. in review for a 
procedure that avoids this issue). 
One drawback with this procedure, of course, is that the inequity experienced by the animals 
is caused by the experimenter rather than a social partner.  Of course, the response are still 
illustrative for showing that the primates both notice and react to their partners’ outcomes, 
nonetheless the lack of clarity over the actual referent of the primates’ distress means that it is 
challenging to say whether the frustration is caused by the partner’s behavior, the experimenter’s 
behavior, or the partner’s outcome.  Some research has addressed this by looking at how the 
primates respond when their partner’s outcome determines their reward, for instance when the 
partner has to choose a distribution or when the two individuals have to repeatedly negotiate 
which reward each will receive for a cooperative task. Both of these procedures indicate that the 
non-human primates, at least, are highly sensitive to the conspecific’s behavior (Brosnan, 
Freeman et al. 2006; Proctor, Williamson et al. in review). 
Nonetheless, despite the differences in procedure, the work in non-human subjects has been 
critical for understanding the evolution of inequity responses across the primates, including 
humans.   
There are three key findings with respect to the primate work.  First, these results 
demonstrate that responding negatively to inequity in experimental laboratory conditions is not a 
homology shared across the primates (Brosnan 2011).  In particular, work with ten primate 
species spread across the great apes, Old World monkeys, and New World monkeys 
demonstrates that inequity is most common in species that show high levels of cooperation with 
non-kin, non-pair social group members (Brosnan 2011).  That is, primates that routinely form 
coalitions and alliances for support, rank acquisition or territory defense, cooperatively hunt, or 
otherwise socially cooperate, including chimpanzees (Brosnan, Schiff et al. 2005; Brosnan, 
Talbot et al. 2010), capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal 2003; van Wolkenten, Brosnan et 
al. 2007; Fletcher 2008; Takimoto, Kuroshima et al. 2009), macaques (McCleam and Harlow 
1954; Beran, Rumbaugh et al. 2007), and, possibly, bonobos (Bräuer, Call et al. 2009), respond 
to inequity while other, often closely related (Talbot, Freeman et al. 2011) and equally large-
brained species (Meyer, Polidora et al. 1961; Bräuer, Call et al. 2009) do not.  Moreover, these 
results do not map on to other distributions, such as those based on brain size, performance on 
cognitive tasks, or extent of sociality (Brosnan 2011).   
Thus, the non-human primate results seem to support the hypothesis in humans that 
responding to inequity is a mechanism by which individuals may recognize when a cooperative 
partnership is no longer beneficial and find a new partnership which is moreso (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999).  We note here, too, that this may be one of several mechanisms used by other 
species, including humans, to support successful cooperation.  For instance, cleaner fish, 
Laibroides dimidiatus, punish other individuals who cheat in cooperative interactions (Raihani, 
Grutter et al. 2010), indicating that they recognize differences in behavior, yet do not respond to 
inequity in an experimental paradigm (Raihani, McAuliffe et al. 2012).  This has led to the 
hypothesis that this species utilizes punishment rather than partner choice as a mechanism to 
promote successful cooperation, a mechanism which may be present in humans as well (Raihani 
and McAuliffe 2012). 
Second, the primate results highlight the influence of a variety of social and individual 
factors on responses.  At the species level, the degree of interdependence seems to have 
influenced responses to inequity.  That is, cooperative breeders, who must work together in order 
to raise offspring, do not respond to inequitable outcomes in these experimental conditions 
(Neiworth, Johnson et al. 2009), despite high degrees of cooperation.  One possibility is that the 
level of interdependence required to raise offspring is such that responding to a small level of 
inequity is too costly in terms of the benefits lost (Brosnan, 2011).  In fact, humans show a 
similar response within the species, with individuals in close relationships showing different 
responses than those in more contingent relationships (Clark and Grote 2003; Freeman, Sullivan 
et al. in review).  However, the vast majority of the human literature involves strangers, often 
anonymously, removing the possibility of discovering the degree to which relationships may 
affect outcomes.  Clearly more work needs to be done on different relationships, and how these 
relationships may affect outcomes both in humans and other species.  For instance, one 
reasonable hypothesis is that behavior should be different at the commencement of a 
relationship, with subjects being more sensitive to perceived inequities, than as a relationship 
matures and the costs of finding a new partner increase (Brosnan 2011) 
 Third, and related to this, the primate results highlight the variation between individuals 
even within the same species and context.  Considering chimpanzees for the moment, their 
responses are highly variable, based on factors such as rank (Bräuer, Call et al. 2009; Brosnan, 
Talbot et al. 2010), group membership (Brosnan, Schiff et al. 2005), and sex (Brosnan, Talbot et 
al. 2010).  However, very little is known about what causes these differences, and they are often 
not consistent across studies.  For instance, in various chimpanzee studies, chimpanzees have 
shown no sex difference (Brosnan, Schiff et al. 2005), a stronger response by males than females 
(Brosnan, Talbot et al. 2010), and a stronger response by females than males (Hopper, Lambeth 
et al. in review).  This is particularly difficult to pin down given the much smaller sample sizes 
possible in non-human primate studies as compared to human studies.  One recent study looked 
at sex, rank, and age as well as personality and the relationship between the partners, and found 
that chimpanzees’ responses were best predicted by two factors, their personality and the 
frequency with which they had been involved in inequity studies (subjects showed stronger 
responses on earlier as compared to later exposures to inequity; Brosnan, Hopper et al. in prep).  
Thus, while the authors predicted a strong impact of relationship quality, based on both previous 
chimpanzee and human work, this did not turn out to be an important factor.  This is not only 
important for understanding chimpanzees, but for exploring the evolution of these responses. 
There is a growing interest in how humans’ responses vary across such dimensions as sex, 
political views, nationality, ethnicity, or culture (see above), but it may be useful to investigate 
other features, such as personality, relative status, and relationship with the partner as well for a 
fuller understanding of the underlying variability in responses to inequity in humans. 
Comparing Human and Non-human Primates 
 As is clear by now, the non-human primate literature is not directly comparable with the 
human literature, which creates difficulty for a truly comparable approach.  First, the form of the 
games for studies such as these typically differ between humans and other primates (although see 
Brosnan, Parrish et al. 2011; Brosnan, Wilson et al. 2011; Proctor, Williamson et al. in review 
for exceptions to this).  Aside from the form of the game, there are other more subtle differences.  
In the primate games, individuals play with known (not anonymous) others from their social 
group, so bringing with them their previous relationships.  Additionally, in all primate research 
thus far, the primates know what they are to receive prior to making a decision.  This is likely 
critical as it removes any hint of risk, uncertainty, or ambiguity from the interaction, making this 
an area that needs to be much more fully explored.  We emphasize that these subtle differences 
can be avoided.  One of us is involved in a long-term study to compare non-human primates’ and 
humans’ responses to a series of games derived from game theory, utilizing methods that are, as 
much as is possible, identical across species.  These results have been instrumental in 
highlighting ways in which humans do and do not differ from the rest of the primates (Brosnan, 
Parrish et al. 2011; Brosnan, Wilson et al. 2011; Brosnan, Beran et al. in review).  Procedures 
such as these will be essential for a truly comparative approach that allows us to more fully 
understand the evolution of inequity responses. 
 Aside from procedural differences, there are also differences in foci.  Thus far, the non-
human primate work has been focused primarily on distributive inequity, which only represents a 
component of the human work (Brosnan and De Waal 2012; Christen and Glock 2012; Skitka 
2012).  In particular, the human work has focused on procedural justice, for which there is very 
little evidence in non-human primates.  Only one study to date has explicitly explored procedure 
in non-human primates, and found that, when rewards are the same, chimpanzees do not respond 
to differences in procedure that result in longer delays for some individuals or for additional 
work required by some individuals (Brosnan, Talbot et al. 2010).  In fact, thus far there is no 
evidence that differences in effort lead to inequity responses in non-human primates (Fontenot, 
Watson et al. 2007; van Wolkenten, Brosnan et al. 2007), although it is clear that a task of some 
sort is required (Brosnan, Talbot et al. 2010; Price and Brosnan 2012) .  Finally, although issues 
of risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty in response to inequity are beginning to be investigated in 
humans (see above), this is entirely unexplored in other species, and is necessary to fully 
understand these behaviors. 
Finally, despite many similarities in outcome, there are also differences that must be 
considered for a full understanding of how this response evolved and what function it may play.  
As it stands, primates look like they lack an overall preference for equity; individuals are very 
concerned about what they receive, and respond negatively when they get less than a partner, but 
generally do not behaviorally respond when they get more (Brosnan 2012; Brosnan and De Waal 
2012).  There is evidence that they notice the discrepancy (Brosnan, Talbot et al. 2010), and it 
may be that our experimental designs are not conducive to eliciting such prosocial responses 
(Murphy and Miller 1955).  In particular, as discussed above, despite chimpanzees’ apparent 
disinterest in their partners’ outcomes (Silk, Brosnan et al. 2005; Jensen, Hare et al. 2006), 
capuchin monkeys are quite responsive (de Waal, Leimgruber et al. 2008), even to the point of 
bringing their partner more than they will receive (Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; Brosnan, 
Houser et al. 2010).  Thus, future work is needed to delineate the magnitude of this apparent 
difference between humans and other primates. 
Future Directions 
 Thus we see several directions that are necessary for a full understanding of the evolution 
of inequity responses.  Many of the more general foci are outlined in a recent special issue 
exploring inequity in other species (Social Justice Research, volume 25, issues 2 & 3; see 
specifically Brosnan and De Waal 2012).  Thus here we focus on those issues most relevant to 
the topics at hand.  First, it is necessary to gain more information about how primates would 
respond under the veil of ignorance, and how these results compare both to 1) their results when 
outcomes are known and 2) humans’ behavior both when outcomes are known and unknown.  
This may provide more insight in to whether non-human primates, like humans, have a taste for 
equity, or are simply averse to receiving less than a partner.   
Second, risk tolerance should be combined with inequity studies, both in humans and 
non-humans, to determine the degree to which risk influences responses.  We know that primates 
vary in both their risk preferences (e.g., Heilbronner, Rosati et al. 2008; Rosati and Hare 2010; 
Proctor, de Waal et al. in prep) and their responses to inequity (see above), providing another 
possible explanation for the variation in responses to inequity seen across the species. However, 
nothing is known about whether and how risk preferences influence judgments of or responses to 
inequity. 
Third, and perhaps more basically, we need additional studies that are comparable 
between humans and other primates.  As discussed above, some such studies do exist, but they 
are only now becoming common. These are important for two reasons.  First, different 
assumptions are made in the two fields, and more attention to these assumptions may highlight 
gaps in the existing literature.  As a single example, in the non-human literature, inequity is not 
considered to occur unless the researcher can explicitly rule out that the mere presence of a better 
outcome, without a social partner receiving it, would cause a similar reaction (reviewed in 
Brosnan 2012).  However, such a control for contrast effects (Reynolds 1961) is typically lacking 
in other species (although see Sloan, Baillaregeon et al. 2012).  It is possible that different 
phenomenon are being conflated in comparisons between the human and non-human literatures, 
and additionally, without attention to these basic processes, it is impossible to determine whether 
similar outcomes are due to similar or dissimilar cognitive mechanisms.  Second, without a fully 
comparative approach shedding light on how humans and other primates are both similar to each 
other and different from each other, we cannot hope to understand the features that selected for 
humans’ responses to inequity, or the function for which these responses evolved.  This requires 
both human and non-human researchers to explore the questions that are asked in the other 
fields.   
 
Conclusion 
 For the current paper, our goal was to synthesize the literature in light of these two main 
areas.  To our knowledge, these questions have barely been explored in either the human or the 
non-human literature, thus broaching the conversation is an important first step.  A second goal 
was to develop a series of predictions based on these hypotheses and, as a third goal, provide a 
series of future directions for research in order to address these important issues.  We believe this 
is an important step in providing a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of responses to 
inequity in humans and other species. 
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